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Homosexuality and the Validity of 
Marriage - The Developing Jurisprudence 
Thomas J. Green 
Father Green is assistant pro-
fessor of canon law at The Catho-
lic University of America. He has 
been chairman of the Task Force 
on the Revision of the Code of 
Canon Law since 1972, and holds 
the S.T.L. and J .C.D. from Gre-
gorian University in Rome. 
Church tribunals are increas-
ingly dealing with cases of alleged 
marital nullity because of homo-
sexuality. This article will explore 
the state of the question regard-
ing the evolving jurisprudence in 
such cases. The author presup-
poses his readers' familiarity with 
the medical literature and will 
concentrate on the decisions of 
Church courts on the marital ca-
pacity of homosexuals.) 
How do canonists understand 
homosexuality? Tobin defines it 
as " ... that condition of psy-
chosexual immaturity character-
ized by a predominant erotic at-
traction for a sexual object of the 
same sex."2 The Rotal judge 
Anne states: "Generically homo-
sexuality is described as a devia-
tion of the sexual instinct -where-
by an individual opts exclusively 
or prevalently in his dealings and 
erotic encounters for a partner of 
the same sex; this is often mani-
fest unconsciously in sexual phan-
tasies and dreams."3 
Church courts are primarily 
concerned with the psychosexual 
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inversion characteristic of homo-
sexuality rather than with homo-
sexual behavior as such. One is 
not a homosexual merely because 
he engages in sexual relations 
with a person of the same sex. 
This may indicate a psychosexual 
tendency, but it is not necessarily 
a conclusive proof of homosexuali-
ty. The real legal issue is the 
deeply rooted character disorder, 
the psychosexual inversion, the 
homoerotic attraction and con-
version and heterosexual repul-
sion or withdrawa1.4 The courts 
have generally focused attention 
on the genuine homosexual, i.e. 
" . . . people who are always ho-
mosexual" as opposed to pseudo 
or situational homosexuals, i.e. 
" ... people who in normal con-
ditions would be heterosexual but 
who turn to persons of the same 
sex as a means of satisfying sex-
ual tension produced by stress of 
particular circumstances ... " S 
A key issue is whether homo-
sexuality as such, apart from oth-
er considerations, is a separate 
ground of nullity. This was not 
true in the past, and there still 
does not seem to be any juris-
prudential consensus. However, 
recently three Rotal decisions 
have viewed homosexuality as a 
relatively autonomous basis of 
nullity. First of all it would be 
well to consider briefly the tradi-
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tional grounds for nullity in such 
cases. 
The marriage of the homosex-
ual might be null for reasons not 
unique to the homosexual (indi-
rect approach). Homosexuality 
might be symptomatic of an un-
derlying mental illness. Or it 
might render intercourse impos-
sible. Or the homosexual may 
marry only to create a facade of 
respectability. Hence he might 
exclude Christian marriage total-
ly or perhaps rule out an essential 
property: children, fidelity or per-
petuity. 
The homosexual's spouse might 
suspect the heterosexuality of the 
prospective partner and make it a 
condition sine qua non for marital 
validity. Or the homosexual's 
partner might be unaware of the 
condition and subsequently chal-
lenge the validity of the marriage 
because of a substantial error 
about the spouse. 
Homosexuality itself might be 
the basis for the nullity (direct 
approach). Homosexuality might 
be viewed as such a compulsive 
reality that a person would be 
irresistibly drawn to such be-
havior and hence not free to enter 
a heterosexual union. Or homo-
sexuality might be comparable to 
impotence since such a person is 
substantially unable to assume 
and fulfill marital rights and 
duties permanently.6 
Indirect Approach to Invalidity 
of Marriage of Homosexual 
1. On part of homosexual. 
a) Underlying mental illness. 
Homosexuality may be sympto-
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matic of or related to numerous 
mental or personality disorders. 
It cuts across many known diag-
nostic categories although obses-
sive n e u r 0 s e s, behavioral or 
character disorders and schizo-
phrenic reactions are reported 
most frequently J Such factors 
may invalidate a marriage from 
two standpoints. An individual 
may lack the minimal theoretical 
knowledge of marriage because of 
an affective disturbance influenc-
ing his intellectual capacity.s Or 
such theoretical knowledge may 
be practically ineffective since an 
affective disturbance may pre-
clude the will from operating free-
ly in accord with said knowledge. 
Hence the homosexual's marriage 
may be null not because of homo-
sexuality as such but because of 
inadequate knowledge or due 
freedom in expressing consent.Q 
b) Psychic impotence. 
Canonical impotence is the 
antecedent and perpetual inca-
pacity of a man or woman to per-
form acts apt for generation. JO 
Physicians and canonists may dif-
fer on the meaning of impotence. I I 
Here male impotence means the 
inability to have an erection, 
penetrate and seminate within the 
vagina. Female impotence is an 
inability to receive the male mem-
ber and the depositing ejaculate. l ! 
Organic impotence refers to a 
physical, anatomical or organic 
deficiency of the sexual organs. 
Functional or psychic impotence 
refers to the imperfect function-
ing of organically perfect organs. 
Generally jurisprudence has con-
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sidered homosexuals organically 
capable of heterosexual inter-
course. However the homosexual 
inversion may make one psy-
chically impotent for such inter-
course, e.g., Rotal decision of Sab-
batani of December 20, 1963. How-
ever a Rotal decision of Canals of 
October 24,1967 noted that an un-
certainty regarding the possible 
"cure" of the homosexuality 
posed questions about the per-
petuity of the alleged impotence 
required by traditional jurispru-
dence and canon 1068. 13 
At times a petition is submitted 
to the Holy See seeking the dis-
solution of a homosexual's mar-
riage because it was not con-
summated. This is not a nullity 
action, which would have to es-
tablish the incapacity for inter-
course. The non-consummation 
process clarifies the factual fail-
ure of the couple to consummate 
the marriage, whatever the rea-
son(s). 14 
c) Simulation 
Individuals presumably marry 
without basic reservations vitiat-
ing marital consent. Yet occasion-
ally people may externally con-
sent while internally rejecting 
marriage entirely or one of its 
essential properties. I ; Homosex-
uals may marry for various rea-
sons, e.g. hope for a cure, social 
benefits and protection, family 
pressure, etc.16 Apprehensions 
about a successful marriage may 
prompt them to propose a trial 
marriage (intention against per-
petuity) especially if they wish to 
create a facade of respectabilityY 
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Ambiguous feelings or a positive 
aversion to children might moti-
vate an exclusion of children from 
the marriage (intention against 
children) .18 These grounds may 
be connected since "when mar-
riage is entered on a trial basis 
frequently children will be ex-
cluded also lest they exercise a 
hindering effect upon a future, 
hypothetical attempt at dissolu-
tion of the bond."19 
Canonists have disputed the 
implications of homosexual be-
havior for marital fidelity. Can-
onically this has mea n t the 
exclusive mutual commitment of 
the parties for generative acts. 
The crucial issue is the degree to 
which homosexual behavior in-
trinsically limits that exclusive 
commitment. A It h 0 ugh ques-
tioned by some canonists today, 
the traditional view has been that 
an intention to continue homo-
sexual practices after marriage 
does not substantially vitiate 
marital fidelity, which is spe-
cifically related to heterosexual 
acts. While homosexual behavior 
might be grounds for an ecclesi-
as tic a I separation, it has not 
been the basis for a nullity action 
(intention against fidelity). 20 
2. On part of homosexual's 
spouse. 
a) Condition. 
Traditionally Western canon 
law has permitted conditional 
marriages. Accordingly a circum-
stance may be attached to the 
marital commitment; if not veri-
fied a nullity action may be in-
stituted.21 The prospective part-
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ner might suspect the homosex-
uality of his spouse and make 
heterosexuality a condition sine 
qua non for marriage. Without 
entering into various evidentiary 
issues, " ... the quicker a person 
declares the marriage null be-
cause of the unfulfilled condition 
and effects a separation, the 
easier it is to conclude to the 
presence of a true condition."22 
b) Error. 
Perhaps relatively few mar-
riages are entered conditionally. 
More often the homosexual's 
spouse may be unaware of his 
condition. Such a person may sub-
sequently allege that the homo-
sexual spouse was substantially 
different from the person she in-
tended to marry. Today Church 
courts are expanding the notion 
of error about personal qualities 
amounting to a substantial error 
about the person.2J This may in-
clude error about the homosex-
uality of a prospective spouse. 
Traditionally the courts differen-
tiated between substantial error 
which invalidated a marriage and 
accidental error which did not. If 
one physical person were mis-
taken for another, it was substan-
tial error. The so-called error of 
quality was substantial only if it 
involved a particular feature of a 
person setting him apart from all 
others. Other qualities such as 
homosexuality were g e n era II y 
considered accidental and non-
invalidating. It was felt that a 
more broad interpretation would 
undermine the stability of mar-
riage. However in recent years a 
concern for personal rights and 
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the quality of the marriage rela-
tionship has suggested a reevalu-
ation of the traditional notion of 
substantial error.2• Accordingly 
a developing jurisprudence con-
siders invalidating an error about 
a true quality of the other party, 
present at the time of the mar-
riage, objectively or subjectively 
serious, unknown to the marriage 
partner, fraudulently concealed in 
view of marital consenFi and 
leading to a relational crisis upon 
discovery. Jurisprudential devel-
opments have also prompted re-
formulation of statutory law.26 
At times the difference between 
error and condition seems slight. 
The following guideline seems 
helpful: when deceit is high and 
awareness is low, error is the like-
ly basis of nullity. Where aware-
ness is high and deceit is low, a 
condition is more likelyY 
Direct Approach to Invalidity of 
Marriage of Homosexual 
Jurisprudence has generally not 
considered homosexuality as an 
autonomous basis of nullity.2s 
However two approaches move in 
this direction. 
1. Irresistible impulse. 
On March 15, 1956 the Rotal 
judge Lamas rejected a lower 
court's viewing homosexuality as 
an autonomous basis of nullity 
because of the homosexual's al-
legedly irresistible impulses. None 
of the traditional bases for ad-
judicating the marriage of a ho-
mosexual were present. In fact 
the homosexual partner apparent-
ly did not experience any note-
worthy repugnance for heterosex-
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ual intercourse. Lamas repudiated 
any suggestion that the homo-
sexual's irresistible inclination to 
engage in such behavior preclud-
ed his freedom to consent to mar-
riage. This would have implied a 
determinism apparently minimiz-
ing imputability for actions affect-
ed under the influence of pas-
sion.29 
2. Incapacity of fulfilling mari-
tal obligations. 
The most significant develop-
ment in this area is the post-
conciliar jurisprudential s h i f t 
from focusing on a person's ability 
to give consent to his capacity to 
fulfill the obligations of that 
heterosexual union which is mar-
riage. Even before the close of the 
Council, Keating foreshadowed 
such a development . .\o He notes 
the traditional difficulties in ad-
judicating the marriages of homo-
sexuals. Then he suggests cha~g­
ing the court's concern from the 
act of marital consent to the par-
ties' capacity of realizing the ob-
ligations flowing from such a com-
mitment. The real basis of the 
nullity of the marriage of the 
homosexual is not to be discerned 
primarily in the components of 
the act of consent but rather in 
the person's incapacity of binding 
himself seriously to the essential 
obligations of the relationship. '! I 
Whether or not a person (e.g. 
homosexual) has sufficient dis-
cretion to consent to marriage is 
not really the radical jurispruden-
tial issue. Rather it's the individ-
ual's ability to assume and fulfill 
the rights and obligations flowing 
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from such consent. 32 Particularly 
helpful to the courts in this con-
nection is the aid of professional 
expertise concerning the dynamics 
of human behavior. The key issue 
here for the courts is not: "does 
the person understand the nature 
and essential properties of mar-
riage?" (due discretion) but rath-
er "does the person have the 
ability to assume the obligations 
and burdens of married life?" 
(due competence) .!J 
Three Rotal decisions illustrate 
this development well. Two con-
sider both due discretion and due 
competence. One deals entirely 
with due competence. 
The first decision of Lefebvre 
of December 2, 1967 involved a 
male homosexual physician who 
married a female philosophy pro-
fessor. The marriage ended after 
three months when the physician 
was arrested for sexual offense in-
volving young men and sentenced 
to prison. ,1 I 
For Lefebvre the homosexual is 
often so disturbed by interior con-
flicts that he is immature in ap-
prehension and will and lacks 
sufficient marital discretion. Mar-
rying validly requires the posses-
sion of a critical faculty, the 
ability to judge, which implies a 
coordination of the higher facul-
ties of intellect and will. The 
above-mentioned physician was 
nervous, depressed, constantly 
afflicted with guilt feelings and 
regularly engaged in bizarre be-
havior. His homosexual acting out 
was apparently independent of 
his will and somewhat uncon-
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ciously caused. A judgment of 
nullity was rendered because of a 
lack of due discretion. 
Furthermore, for Lefebvre the 
homosexual cannot give and re-
ceive that perpetual and exclusive 
right to procreative acts at the 
heart of marital consent. No one 
can contract for obligations he is 
incapable of fulfilling. The issue 
is not the positive exclusion of the 
object of marriage (which presup-
poses the capacity of fulfilling 
marital commitments) but Ii more 
basic personal inability to ex-
c han get h e above-mentioned 
right. The physician in question 
was opposed to conjugal relations, 
married for intellectual reasons, 
experienced difficulties in con-
summating the union and regu-
larly engaged in sexual relations 
with young men. Nullity was also 
declared because this homosexua1 
propensity rendered him incapa-
ble of undertaking marital obliga-
tio.ns.·l .; 
A second more significant de-
cision was issued by Anne on Feb-
ruary 25, 1969. 3G A woman had en-
gaged in homosexual activity from 
adolescence until sho.rtIy before 
her marriage, ceased such activity 
for four years during which she 
bore three childrel) and then be-
gan to engage in homosexual ac.-
tivity after a chance meebng with 
,another female h(')m(')sexual. The 
lnarriage endep after ten years. 
The husband sought an an)1\il-
mef)t because .his wife's lesbian-
ism made her jncapable of f\.:llfilJ-
ing her role as a wife ~nd )uother. 
After two eontn\.dktol'Y de(;l:sio.I)S 
in Montreal, the case was sub-
mitted to the Rota. 
The decision is particularly 
noteworthy since it explores the 
juridical implications of Vatican 
II's theological-pastoral insights 
on marriageY It is especially sig-
nificant in emphasizing the object 
of marital consent as a right to a 
communion of life and love. This 
transcends the more narrow pre-
conciliar stress on the right to the 
body for procreative actsY 
Anne states that canon 1081 
on the indispensability of marital 
consent has to be interpreted in 
light of paragraph 48 of the Pas-
toral Constitution. ' " This latter 
text speaks of married life as a 
partnership and covenant rooted 
in the irrevocable commitment of 
the parties to each other. Tech-
nically canon 1081 covers all pos-
sible defects of marital consent. 
However frequently the issue is 
not so much the quality of con-
sent (e.g. exclusion of a given 
property of marriage) but rather 
a deficiency of the formal object 
of consent, i.e. the inability to 
give and receive the object of 
marital consent, perhaps because 
of certain overpowering sexual 
impulses. 4 u 
lIe refers to the above-men-
tioned decision of Lefebvre and 
to a.n earlier decision he re.ndered 
Ol) January 17, 1967 in the case 
of a nymphomaniac, both of 
wh.i(;h stressep that no one ca.l) 
co.ntract ,obligations who js il)(;a-
PabJe of f\,llfilling them. 41 He then 
:asks : can homosexuality ,as ,Sw;:h 
PI? considered an p,!;ltonO.IIl.9\,lS 
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basis for nullity above and be-
yond the traditional ways of ap-
proaching invalidity in this area? 
Can one say that homosexuals are 
radically incapable of assuming 
and fulfilling marital obliga-
tions?42 It is also noteworthy that 
Anne takes as his example for 
jurisprudential development the 
truly inverse homosexual condi-
tion which excludes all sexual 
ambivalence. 
In discussing canon 1081, 2 
Anne observes that in light of 
Vatican II the formal object of 
marital consent must be viewed 
differently : 
"The forma l substa ntial object of 
marriage, therefore , is not only the 
ius in corpus that is perpetua l and 
exclusive for the pu rpose of acts for 
the procrea tion of children, exclud-
ing every other forma l element, but 
comprises even the ius ad vitae 
consorliul1t or cOlnm,unitate l1t vitae 
(right to life pa rtnership or com-
munity of life) which is prope rly 
called m a trimonia l with its correla -
tive obligations or the right to the 
intima te union of persons a nd 
works by which they perfect one 
anothe r so that they unite with 
God in procreating a nd educating 
new living persons (Hunwnae 
vitae ) ."43 
Anne thereby stresses the inti-
mate relationship between con-
jugal companionship and sexual 
intercourse not always uppermost 
in earlier jurisprudence. While it 
is not always easy to clarify the 
components of such a community 
of life in practice, the ability to 
live a common life is certainly cru-
cial to marital validity.44 In prac-
tice it may be easier to demon-
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strate that a given individual is 
deprived of those elements neces-
sary to establish a community of 
life existentially. The courts can-
not merely consider the intel-
lectual-volitional status of the 
parties at the time of the mar-
riage. Rather they must be equal-
ly attentive to the relational 
abilities of individuals inasmuch 
as marriage is preeminently an 
ongoing per son a I commitment 
with biological, psychological and 
spiritual dimensions. In dealing 
with particular cases, Anne 
stresses the importance of the 
court's considering marriage in 
light of the exigencies of the natu-
ral law, the cultural forces that 
shape marriage differently in var-
ious societies and the psychic 
strengths and weaknesses of the 
individual couple. Some elements 
may be essential to marriage 
everywhere prescinding from cul-
tural differences, whereas other 
elements might be important to 
the success of marriage but not 
absolutely indispensable for a 
canonically valid union. 
Subsequently Anne deals with 
the case in question and the im-
plications of homosexuality for 
marital validity in light of the 
community of life and love which 
is a crucial part of the formal ob-
ject of marriage. He is cautious in 
enumerating those psychic dis-
turbances that would vitiate a 
commitment to a common life. 
Yet he clearly states that serious 
perversions of the heterosexual 
instinct, as in truly inverse homo-
sexuality, preclude the establish-
ment of the community of life we 
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call marriage. He does not further 
elaborate on the issue. However, 
what is important is that the 
basis has been laid for further 
jurisprudential developments. 
Jurists continue to reflect on the 
legal implications of marriage as 
a community of life and love and 
their applicability to various dis-
orders-not merely cases involv-
ing alleged homosexuals.4 ; Inter-
estingly enough in the above case, 
Anne did not annul the union 
since the woman was capable of 
living a married life, had three 
children, didn't deny her husband 
sexual relations and could have 
been helped with a greater meas-
ure of understanding on his part. 
Despite clear evidence of bisexual 
tendencies, the court judged that 
her incapacity for marriage had 
not been clearly established. 
It is appropriate to note a dif-
ference in the way the courts 
have approached male and female 
homosexuality in its impact on 
marital validity. Lesage notes a 
fairly established jurisprudence 
stating that for the male homo-
sexual a truly heterosexual com-
munity is practically impossible. 
However that is not necessarily 
the case for a female homosexual, 
who does not always find con-
jugal life repugnant and whose 
sexual propensities do not always 
quench her maternal instinct. It 
may be easier for the female 
homosexual to lead a reasonably 
satisfactory conjugal life through 
sub lim a tin g her homosexual 
drives in various ways. +6 
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Conclusion 
In general it can be said that 
the possibilities for dealing ca-
nonical~y with the alleged nullity 
of marnages of homosexuals have 
been enhanced considerably in re-
cent . ye~rs. This is particularly 
true III lIght of the growing tend-
e~cy ~o appreciate the legal im-
plIcatlOns of the conciliar teach-
in~ on marriage as a lifelong com-
mItment of life and love. There is 
no jurisprudential consensus as 
yet. However, the nullity of the 
marriages of homosexuals is in-
creasingly being considered on the 
basis of their incapacity to fulfill 
the basic heterosexual obligations 
of marriageY The shift away 
from a nearly exclusive concen-
tration on the status of mind and 
will ?f the contracting party at 
the tIme of the marriage and the 
tendency to assess the parties' ca-
pacity for a lifelong relationship 
has enabled Church courts to of-
fer a more enlightened jurispru-
dence. Likewise the expansion of 
the concept of substantial error 
about the quality of a person has 
also aided individuals trapped in 
particularly destructive marital 
situations and see kin g the 
Church's ministry to begin life 
anew within the community. 
However, as a final note, it is im-
portant to avoid easy generaliza-
tions. Fairness to persons and a 
responsible judicial practice make 
this imperative. 
"In reaching a decision in a given 
case. attention must be paid espe-
cially to the predominate etiology, 
to the ch I'Onological poin t of o rigin , 
to the exclusivity of the attraction, 
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to the motives for marriage, to the 
post nuptial adjustment and to the 
length of cohabitation. . the ever 
present question will be: is this per-
son, because of homosexuality, in-
curably incapable of fulfilling the 
basic spiritual, affectional and emo-
t ional needs .of the partner and the 
children on a long term basis? If so, 
that perSDn is morally impotent. "48 
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